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We take our point of departure in Hermain 
Sinclair’s (1988) and Ernst von Glaserfeld’s 
(1988) recent discussion of constructivism in 
relation to early mathematics education. As 
both authors deal with some central themes 
within constructivism, we will make a few 
general comments first and thereafter briefly 
develop some of the implications for 
mathematics education in the early school years. 
To begin with we would like once again to 
reflect briefly on the core meaning of 
constructivism, especially in relation to the 
qualified form ctradical constructivism>>. Sinclair 
declares that she uses the term ttconstructivism)) 
in the sense of ((Piagetian constructivism>>, and 
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she explains that constructivism sees our mental 
or material actions as the main source of 
knowledge. This is in contrast with the 
empiricistic notion that knowledge originates 
from ((the outer reality>, through our senses 
impinging on our minds. 
von Glasersfeld locates constructivism in a 
wider intellectual context (of rationalism) and 
refers to the early 18th century philosopher 
Giambattista Vico as the chief inspirer. ((Radical 
constructivism>> stands for - in von 
Glaserfeld’s use of the term - the view that 
our knowledge is always confined to the world 
of human experience and that it cannot be 
judged against the criterion of how well it 
matches the world as it is; at best our knowledge 
will fit our pursuit or goals. 
According to von Glasersfeld not even the 
most radical form of constructivism would, 
however, deny the existence of a reality 
independent of the experiencing human beings. 
It is just that this meal>> reality is out of our 
reach, it is not available for rational knowledge. 
It is exactly this demand that our search for 
objective truth should be abandoned that 
triggered some rather hostile comments during 
the 1987 Psychology of Mathematics Education 
meetings (see Kilpatrick, 1987; Wheeler, 1987). 
Our own position coincides with neither that 
of constructivism, nor that of realism (according 
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to which true knowledge mirrors what the world 
is really like). We agree very much with the 
constructivist stance, and especially with von 
Glasersfeld’s emphasis on the world-as- 
experienced as the realm of human thought. 
But, for the economy of the argument, coupled 
with the need to give some background to what 
will follow, we will restrict ourselves to 
mentioning just one point of fundamental 
disagreement. 
1. THE NATURE OF HUMAN-WORLD 
RELATIONS 
The main problem with constructivism 
(including radical constructivism) is, in our view, 
that the individual and the world are seen as 
separated from each other. This leads to 
paradoxes. For example, according to the 
constructivist way of thinking, the individual 
can never get in touch with the reality that he 
is divorced from. As all knowledge is assumed 
to be derived from the individual’s constructing 
activity it is very difficult to see how he can 
find out about the constraints imposed by the 
surrounding world that would lead t o  
accomodation. After all, the constraints 
experienced must be - according to the 
constructivist assumption - constructed 
constraints and these must be formed in 
accordance with the properties of already given 
scheme activity. As Feffer (1988) points out: 
... the subject can only adjust his receptors 
to  constructed shapes )), constructed 
(<demands)) and, indeed, constructed 
<(feedback)). In terms of the constructionist 
proposition, then, the reality that serves to 
correct an assimilatory construction can only 
be rendered as another construction by an 
already given scheme, and we are no closer 
to the <<real)> object than when we started. 
In sum, there can be no last court of appeal 
to an independently constituted reality in the 
course of holding to the constructionist 
proposition, for the judgment handed down 
will iltself turn out to be the result of a 
distorting construction. (3: pp. 18-19) 
An alternative to the epistemological (and 
ontological) position of constructivism is based 
on the principle of intentionality, one of the 
cornerstones of the phenomenological tradition. 
According to this principle all mental acts are 
directed towards something, something beyond 
themselves. To think, for instance, is always to 
think something and to perceive is always to 
perceive something. The individual’s experience 
of the world is a relation between the individual 
and the world, both are presupposed. Thus there 
are not two separate entities (individual and 
world) plus a relation between them; the world- 
as-experienced is all there is. The world we 
know, experience, think about must necessarily 
be a world known, experienced, thought about. 
Quite obviously, we cannot think of what a 
world in itself, a world not thought about, 
would be like. And a known, experienced, 
thought about world presupposes a knowing, 
experiencing, thinking subject. Likewise, the acts 
of knowing, experiencing, thinking presuppose 
a world to know, experience and think about. 
It is, however, not a world only inside our heads, 
it is a real world (tout there)). It can be 
experienced in different ways, of course, but in 
relation to certain criteria we can surely argue 
tha t  one  way of experiencing it (or 
understanding it) is better (in the sense of being 
deeper, or more efficient, or the like) than 
another.  The  claim t h a t  there is no 
independently constituted reality, or that there 
is no absolute knowledge of transcendental 
nature, means simply that we can in no way 
come up with a finite description of anything. 
Phenomena are fundamentally inexhaustible as 
far as possible descriptions of them are 
concerned. Some modes of experience are 
shared by a culturally ou professionally defined 
group of people, others of all human beings, 
yet others of all mammals and so on. But we 
can never claim that there are no other ways 
of seeing a phenomenon than the ones that we 
know of. In this sense the world of human 
beings includes the human beings themselves. 
An experience always takes someone to do the 
experiencing and something to be experienced; 
the experience comprises a relation between 
them. This is why this school of thought can 
be called constitutionalism. 
The next thing we would like to do is to link 
this general line of reasoning with some 
implications for mathematics education. In 
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order to do so let us briefly consider the 
Piagetian distinction that appears in Hermaine 
Sinclair’s paper, between empirical and reflective 
abstraction. The former refers to the abstraction 
of ((the properties of objects)) and the latter 
to the abstraction of <<one’s own action and 
reasoning coordination)). Logic and 
mathematics is said to be based on the second 
kind of abstraction, and we can also think of 
it as being a higher, second order abstraction 
in comparison with the first kind of abstraction. 
Sinclair gives two examples: She argues that 
((weight>> as an object of thought needs both 
kind of abstractions, ((number>> as an object 
of thought, on the other hand, only needs the 
second kind. 
Now, one might object that thinking about 
numbers also reflects some aspect of the 
experienced world and not only of the 
experiencing individual. Numbers are also 
human-world relations. This is a highly relevant 
point for exemplifying how the difference 
between a constructivist and a constitutional 
view may show itself in differing interpretations 
of what it takes to develop elementary 
arithmetic skills. 
2. DOUBLE COUNTING 
Steffe, von Glasersfeld, Richards and Cobb 
(1983) have described, within a constructivist 
frame-work, five increasingly sophisticated types 
of units that children create when they count. 
The fifth and most advanced of these counting 
types is supposed to illustrate the second kind 
of abstraction named by Sinclair. The concrete 
criterion set up by Steffe et al. for inferring that 
a child has reached this level, is the ability to 
count counting words: 
... we infer this final accomplishment when 
the child spontaneously uses ((double 
counting)) ... for example, if the problem is 
{(to count on seven from nine)) and the child 
says: ((9 ... 10 is 1, 11 is 2, 12 is 3 ... 16 is- 
sixteen)) (p. 43). 
Our own understanding of the significance 
of double counting is distinctly different. Prior 
to the main investigation, which we are going 
to describe later, a pilot study was conducted 
in which it was observed that the most salient 
difference between pupils with specific 
mathematics difficulties and their class mates 
was specifically that the former group of 
children could use no problem solving strategies 
other than <<double counting)) (Eriksson & 
Neuman, 1981). Their difficulty seemed to be 
that they had found no other methods for 
finding out the size of the added or subtracted 
term if it was greater than the subitizing range 
(i.e. the range for number units that we can 
perceive immediately, usually up to 3). They 
tried to ((hear)) its size through enumerating the 
number words corresponding to the units in it. 
If the number of words was still not perceptible, 
they had to count them by keeping track in 
some way. 
Their <<double counting)) was rarely done in 
the way described by Steffe et al., who describe 
children saying, for example, ((Three is one, four 
is two ... )> etc., but they counted the words in 
the added or subtracted term on their fingers. 
Thus one finger was raised for each word 
enumerated, e.g. in the task 9-6, the pupil would 
raise one finger for each of 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 
and recognize that raising the sixth finger meant 
that counting should stop. 
The problem with the ((double counting>> 
method is that it does not lead to functional 
arithmetic skills. As soon as there are more than 
three counting words they have to be counted 
in some way. This is an effective barrier to 
developing the skill of mental calculation, and 
thus also of estimation. Further, it prevents the 
child from learning the multiplication tables and 
thus also carrying out divison. 
When the pupils with mathematics difficulties 
got multiplication tasks to solve, they calculated, 
for example, 7x8 by saying ... 16 ... 17, 18, 19, 
and so on, raising a finger for any word 
enumerated. However, they fairly soon lost track 
of the number of times they had enumerated 
the eight words they counted each time on their 
fingers. In order to solve that task they would 
need to be able to ((triple count)) in some way. 
Even in the highest grades in the compulsory 
school such pupils found it necessary to resort 
to ((double counting)) even to solve some simple 
subtraction and missing addend tasks within the 
number range 1-10, as the difficulty had less 
to do with the size of the whole number than 
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with the size of the part; if the first word is 
not (<one)), the last word does not give the 
answer. It was this part that always had to be 
<<double counted)) if it was larger than a 3 ~ .  
That they had not acquired what are usually 
called the ccbasic number facts)) - not even 
within the number range 1-10 - was another 
of the salient traits in the arithmetic skills - 
or rather lack of skills - of the children with 
mathematical difficulties. 
However, we do not use wish to the term 
ctnumber facts)) when referring to, knowledge 
of the part-whole combinations within the 
number range 1-10, since we do not think of 
this knowledge as <(remembered facts)) but as 
a strongly conceptual kind of knowledge. We 
have proposed that the knowledge of the part- 
whole combinations of the first ten numbers 
should be referred to as the knowledge of the 
(<ten basic concepts)). 
When the child can divide up the ten first 
positive numbers into two parts, each of these 
building stones in the decimal system has 
become a concept, possible to think of in many 
different ways. For example, 8 can be thought 
of as 2/6, 4/4, 315, etc. and also as a part of 
all greater numbers. As the numbers 2 and 6 
are also concepts, 8 thought of as 216 could 
further be thought of as 1/1/3/3/ or 2/2/3/1, 
etc. (In the jardon of phenomenology this is 
tantamount to grasping the essence of 8)’. All 
the numbers within the first decade have become 
a tight <<network)) of relations within and 
between numbers when the ({ten basic concepts)) 
are formed. 
As the pupils with mathematics difficulties 
had not acquired the ((ten basic concepts>), they 
could not solve all different kinds of problems 
- within and outside the number range 1-10 
- using economic analyzing strategies, as the 
other pupils could. For example, these other 
pupils could analyze the quantitative relations 
inherent in the problem in order to see if it were 
possible to reduce the problem to one involving 
a multiple of 10 (for example ((82-7 =75 since 
if you first take 2 away from 7 and 82 
We would like to thank professor Amedeo Giorgi 
of the Saybrook Institute, San Francisco, CA, for 
this and other comments on an earlier version of 
this paper. 
simultaneously you get 80-5 = 7 5 ~ ) .  They could 
also analyse the quantitative relations in order 
to observe if it were possible to group into 
doubles plus-or-minus one (for example 13-6 = 7 
since 6+6=12), or as doubles with units moved 
from one oart to the other (for example 
6+ 8 = 14 because 7 + 7 =  14), a strategy which, 
however, can only occasionally be used. 
In other words, while Steffe et al. (1983) refer 
to double counting as a concrete manifestation 
of the most advanced counting type, Eriksson 
& Neuman (1981) observed double counting as 
the dominant strategy used by children with 
mathematics difficulties. This led them to 
inquire into how the majority of children 
manage to solve simple arithmetic problems 
without double counting. Because they had 
conclued that mastery of the ten basic concepts 
is necessary, an investigation was carried out 
with the aim of revealing how children develop 
this competency, fundamental for arithmetic 
skills. 
3. A PHENOMENOGRAPHIC APPROACH 
TO RESEARCH 
It was mentioned earlier that we prefer to talk 
about {<basic concepts>> rather than ctnumber 
facts)). This is because we put the emphasis on 
how children see (or apprehend, or conceptua- 
lize) numbers and number relations instead of 
asking what facts they may be able to retrieve 
from their long term memories. Such a pers- 
pective is very much in accordance with the 
basic tenets of the research approach called 
phenomenography (Marton, 1981) that has been 
developed in our research group in Gothenburg. 
Phenomenography originates from the 
observation that whatever phenomenon people 
encounter, there seems to be a limited number 
of qualitatively different ways in which that 
phenomenon is seen, experienced o r  
conceptualized. The aim is to reveal and 
describe the differing conceptions, differing 
understandings of the various phenomenon in 
the world around us. Furthermore it is assumed 
that our way of conceptualizing a certain 
phenomenon is the most fundamental aspect 
of our knowledge about our skills related to 
that phenomenon (Marton, 1988). 
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While Piagetian constructivism has a clear 
psychological orientation, the constitutional 
frame-work - to which phenomenography 
clearly belongs - is more easily reconcilable 
with didactic considerations. While the emphasis 
in constructivism is on acts - material or 
mental - constitutuionalism has the unity of 
the act and that which is acted upon as its point 
of departure. This latter stance makes it fairly 
natural to describe different ways of thinking 
about a certain phenomenon, or different ways 
of dealing with that phenomenon, in relation 
to the particular competency we aim to develop 
in an educational setting. The differences can 
then be seen as increasingly functional human- 
world relations. 
In the study we will draw on here (Neuman, 
1987) one hundred and three 7-year-old school 
starters were interviewed about problems set in 
words, involving the number range 1-10, such 
as, for instance: 
If your teacher has only two pencils in her 
box and there are nine children wanting to 
make drawings, how many pencils does she 
heve to get? ( ~ 2 + - = 9 ~ ) ;  
If you have only 3 crowns and you want to 
buy a comic for 7 crowns, how many more 
crowns do you need? ( ( (3+-=7~) ;  
If your teacher has only four pencils in her 
box and there are ten children wanting to 
make drawings, how many more pencils does 
she have to get? (((4+-=10~). 
The children were asked about how they had 
((thought out)) their answers, if it had not been 
possible to observe overt counting. The idea was 
that it might be possible to find strategies that 
these, as yet untaught, school starters had begun 
to use which were teachable and would result 
in the acquisition of the ((ten basic concepts),. 
Of the more than one thousand answers given 
by these 103 school starters, only a total of 12 
children altogether gave 17 answers where some 
kind of ((double counting,, was used in 
<<counting on)) strategies. 
4. ALTERNATIVES TO DOUBLE COUNTING 
HOW, then, did the children in Neuman’s 
study solve the problems? 
Those of them who used strategies which 
yielded correct answers used some of three types 
of strategies, all of them analyzing (or 
structuring) - not counting - strategies. Thus 
they did not ((count out)) - or unitize one unit 
at a time - but they analyzed the quantitative 
relations in the problems - exactly as the older 
pupils who had no mathematics difficulties had 
done in the earlier study. They used three such 
analyzing strategies which will now be described. 
4.1. The first strategy 
Was very similar to those which Resnick 
(1983) has called ((choice)) and cmin)). Neuman 
has called it ((Biggest first>> (1983). The main 
idea in these strategies was that the name of 
the first unit in the largest part should be (cone)). 
In contrast with Resnick’s account, Neuman 
found these strategies in ((counting all)) as well 
as in ((counting on)) strategies, in open sentences 
and subtraction as well as in addition. 
Jonas, a boy who could give practically no 
correct answers in the interviews when he started 
school, had within six weeks - in a follow-up 
interview - found this principle, and could also 
describe how it had been created. He was asked 
how many more pencils a teacher would need 
if she had two in her box but nine children came 
to the class. He solved the question 
((2 + - = 9)) in the following way: 
J: ... seven. 
I: How did you know that? 
J: Well, because I’ve done it on a piece of 
I: You didn’t ... you just sat and looked at 
J: No, but I’ve worked it out at home! 
I: And you remember that? How did you 
J: Like this ... first I took two (drawing in 
I: You can have this piece of paper if you 
J: I took two (draws two lines to the left of 
I: Mmm ... 
J: And that made ... (moves the pencil a bit 
to the right and starts drawing one line 
at a time from to left) ... one, two, three, 
paper. 
the ceiling! 
work it out then? 
the air) ... 
like! 
the paper) like this. 
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four, five, six, seven, eight, nine ... oops. .. 
I did it wrong ... (rubs out the last two 
lines he had drawn). 
So you counted forwards to one, two, 
three, four, five, six, seven now... and you 
knew that they (point at the first two 
lines) still were there? 
Mmm ... 
That’s neat! 
(Neuman, 1987, p. 163) 
4.2 The second strategy 
used was to analyze the whole number in 
order to see if it could be divided up into two 
similar parts, i.e., in order to see if the 
((doubles>> could be of some use. 
4.3. The third strategy 
was to analyze a ((finger number)) in order 
to see if it was possible directly to subitize the 
two parts within the whole. The ways in which 
the children used this strategy depended on 
whether they knew these ((finger numbers)) or 
not. If they did not know them, they first had 
to create them by giving names to each of their 
fingers. One of the children - Susie - solved 
the question ( ( 3 + - = 7 ~  in this way. After 
giving names to her seven fingers - ((1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7~ - she said: 
- Ther e.. (watching her ((finger number),) ... 
now we can start! 
There ... was now the ((finger numbern 
created, and she could begin the analyzing 
process. Susie, who neither knew the ((finger 
number)) for nine (nor that for seven in the 
question ((2 + - = 9 ~ ) ,  started by creating the 
({finger number)) for nine. She then solved the 
problem in the following way: 
S: She had to go and get seven pencils. 
I: So, first you counted nine fingers ... what 
did you do after that? 
S: First I sort of counted five ... Then I put 
up two.. . Then I put put up two more... 
Then I put them down (the two last of 
the nine fingers) and counted them again 
like this ... (counted the seven fingers on 
her lips) (op cit, p. 188). 
Just like Jonas, Susie seemed to understand 
in some way, that if the known part is as small 
as two, the other part cannot be subitized (i.e. 
its numerosity cannot be perceived immediately). 
However, as she watches her ((finger number)) 
she discovers the idea of how to solve this 
problem in a different way from Jonas: she 
discovers that it is possible to group this part 
into a subitizale ((5 + something)) pattern. 
Therefore, without consciously knowing why, 
she ((sort of counted five)), i.e. the whole hand, 
and so put up two fingers more, up to the two 
fingers in the known part, which thus became 
the last fingers in the ((finger numbern, exactly 
as the pencils became the last part of the pencils 
Jonas drew. 
Susie’s ((finger number)) is similar to the 
ancient Roman number for nine, which was a 
picture of the hand and four fingers: VIIII. 
Exactly as this number has to be divided up 
in the parts VII/II if the V-symbol is not to 
be split up, Susie’s fingers are divided up in 
this way in order not to split up the hand. 
Her idea of grouping the large unknown part 
in a way that makes it possible to subitize 
involves the same important idea as the one 
created by Jonas, that the name of the first unit 
in the large part must always be <tone>>. Then 
both parts can immediately be c(subitized>) 
within the whole. In Susie’s case this depends 
on three things, on the large part of the ((finger 
numbern being grouped, on the name of its last 
finger denoting the whole number, and on the 
small part then becoming small enough to 
subitize. 
In order to solve the problem in a more 
economic way, Jonas would have had to be able 
to count backwards: a9, 8... 7)). It was possible 
to observe how difficult this was for children 
who had not created ((finger numbers)). They 
did not seem to trust the first word they arrived 
at in the unknown part as a word denoting this 
part; it was usually the last word that had that 
function. Thus, if any of the above tried 
counting backwards, they counted to ((1)) and 
then back again to the highest ordinal number 
of that part. This kind of counting backwards, 
however, was not carried out in the word 
problems. It was only observed in some 
unanalyzed tasks where some of the objects 
were visible. 
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Susie had to give names to her fingers in 
order to know where the ((finger numbers)) 
ended. However, when the ((finger numbers)> 
are known, children can solve the problem in 
the way Gail does. She just throws a glance at 
her fingers, and answers ((seven)) to the question 
<t2+-=9)>. She has given names to all her 
fingers and illustrates for the interviewer that 
the ring finger of her right hand is ((nine)) and 
that the second forefinger is ctsevenn. It is 
enough for her just to look at her concrete ((row 
of finger numbers)). 
However, this concrete ((row of finger 
numbers)) rather soon seems to be imagined 
again. Niclas has illustrated how the problem 
is then solved. Niclas has got the question 
<<4+-=10)) and answers in this way: 
N: Six. 
I: She has to fetch six ... how did you know 
N: How many children did you say. ..? 
I: I said that she had ten children and four 
pencils. 
N: Yes, because you should put one to four 
(illustrates with his fingers how the thumb 
of the second hand is unitized with the 
four fingers on that hand) and a five here 
(the thumb of the first hand is added to 
the second hand; thus the ((finger 
number)) 4/6/10 is formed). 
I: ??? (The interviewer neither understands 
what Niclas says, nor what he does. So 
she asks again:) Show me... you put your 
fingers ... 
N: There are four like this ... (the four 
fingers on his second hand). 
I: Yes ... and then ... ? 
N: Then I take six (the thumb on his second 
hand) ... I mean then I take one there ... 
(op cit, p. 195). 
that? 
Niclas is illustrating how he has changed his 
known ((finger number)) 515 = 10 into 6/4= 10 
in his thoughts, by moving one thumb over from 
one hand to the other. He illustrates how his 
separate fingers have become names (the 
thumbs, for example, being called ( ( 5 ~  and (c~D), 
but also that the finger group 5 + 1 can be called 
((6)) and that the thumb called ((6)) also could 
be denoted crone>). 
5. HOW QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS INHERENT 
IN THE PROBLEMS APPEAR 
While the ways in which the children dealt 
with the problems in the investigation were being 
observed, it could also be observed how certain 
meanings were constituted, how certain 
quantitative aspects inherent in the problems 
became visible to the children. 
When Susie tries to get hold of how many 
units there are in the unknown part in question 
((2 + - = 9)) the fingers suddenly reveal their 
ccfiveness>>, making it possible for Susie to make 
the large part perceptible by subitizing. For 
Jonas the row of drawn pencils shows that either 
of the pencils at the endpoints could be given 
the name ((1~. 
We can also imagine how the pairs and 
doubles reveal themselves in dicepatterns, in the 
cctwo+two>) legs of animals etc. 
One of the children, Amanda, actually in the 
middle of a problem situation also expresses 
how the world, even if this worls is a part of 
her own body, insists on taking part in solving 
the problem. Having failed to answer some of 
the questions she suddenly says: 
- Let’s see... I’ll count on my fingers ... they 
want me to ... (op cit, p. 147) 
This girl did not even know that she had ten 
fingers when the fingers ((wanted her to use 
them)); she had to count them first. Still - in 
the last question she solved, she had already 
begun to understand how to use them. 
From time to time it is thus illustrated that 
the child does not consciously reflect on how 
to solve the problem. He or she simply explores 
the quantitative relations inherent in it, and 
suddenly something stands out as a figure 
against a background, giving the child an 
intuition of how it might be solved. 
Thus, we claim that children’s problem 
solving strategies are actually formed when the 
quantitative relations in the problem become 
visible to them. Further, we claim that the skills 
for solving quantitative problems are not 
counting skills, but rather ((seeing skills)), 
analytic skills. Children begin to analyze and 
reflect on known numbers, e.g. ((doubles)) and 
((finger numbers)) to which they have given their 
((numerical names)) by counting - or rather 
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by enumeration - and they later analyze 
((imagined numbers)) of this kind. They also 
contemplate how they can transform them in 
different ways into new part-whole relations. 
Niclas, for instance, illustrates how 515 = 10 can 
be transformed into 4/6 = 10. 
Thus we argue that it is the children’s seeing 
of certain quantitative relations that enables 
them to solve simple arithmetic problems. 
Revealing what quantitative relations they ought 
to see or discover is obviously of didactic 
relevance. It is reasonable to believe that such 
insights would increase our possibilities for 
making these relations visible to them. However, 
one more step is needed: the strategies used by 
the children have to be compared with regard 
to how functional they are in relation to the 
goal of mastering the ((ten basic concepts)). 
Of course, ctfiveness)) also reveals its force 
when the fingers are used to count the words 
in ((double counting>>. However, this ctdouble 
counting>) strategy demands that counting is 
carried out twise, simultaneously, - with the 
words and with the fingers - so that its use 
leaves insufficient cognitive resources for more 
complex problem solving. This is why pupils 
who have not found any other strategies end 
up with difficulties in mathematics. The use of 
t<finger-numbers)>, on the other hand, leads 
towards mathematical thinking, since it is the 
fingers themselves that both count and group 
the numbers; and all that is done without any 
counting - just by analyzing. 
The reason why the strategy ((double 
counting)) as described by Steffe et al. (1983) 
is seen by them to be the most advanced 
counting type, and by us to be a strategy leading 
to mathematics difficulties, thus depends, at 
least in part, on the fact that we are more 
interested in how functional the strategy is and 
less in its degree of abstraction. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Our aim in this paper has been to compare 
the constructivist paradigm with an alternative 
frame-work, here called constitutionalism. 
Above all we wanted to show how certain 
differences appear in views on the development 
of arithmetic skills. 
The constructivist paradigm puts the 
emphasis on the individual’s acts, while within 
a constitutional frame-work we are primarily 
interested in how various aspects of the world 
are seen by different individuals. It is only 
against such a background-it is argued-that we 
can understand the individual acts. 
We have claimed that the constitutional 
alternative lends itself more easily to a didactic 
ttknowledge interest)): finding out about the 
implications of different ways of seeing a 
phenomenon should reasonably give us clues 
to what aspects of that phenomenon we should 
try to make visible in teaching. 
It has been suggest, however, that there is a 
more fundamental difference between the two 
alternatives. According to  the idea of 
constructivism the individual cretaes his own 
world. It is a subjective world which is different 
and divorced from the real world which is 
simply available to us. According to the idea 
of constitution, a cornerstone of ((the 
phenomenological movement)>, the individual 
and the world form a unity, we live in the world, 
a world which is an experienced, a lived in, a 
thought about world. It is both objective and 
subjective, a real world, the only world we have. 
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ABSTRACT 
There is a dualistic assumption underlying 
constructivism: thinking takes place in an inner 
subjective world, divorced from the outer objective 
reality and knowledge is constructed there by the 
individual through material and mental acts. In a 
phenomenological framework the fundamental unity 
between human beings and the world in which they 
live is assumed. Knowledge represents ways of seeing, 
experiencing, thinking about the world and it is 
constituted through the internal relation between the 
knower (subject) and the know (object). It is shown 
tha t  these two kinds of ontological and  
epistemological assumption have radically different 
implications for how the development of arithmetic 
skills is seen and conceptualized. 
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